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Populist Constitutions 
David Landau† 
This Essay draws on recent academic definitions of populism and recent ex-
amples of its use in order to show that there is an affinity between populism and 
widespread constitutional change. It argues that populists use constitutional change 
to carry out three functions: deconstructing the old institutional order, developing a 
substantive project rooted in a critique of that order, and consolidating power in the 
hands of populists. Thus, access to the tools of constitutional change may accentuate 
both the promise of populism as a corrective to stagnating liberal democracies and 
the threat that it poses to those constitutional orders. I also argue that there is a 
trajectory to populist constitutionalism: populist constitutions begin by emphasizing 
their promise to improve on existing liberal-democratic constitutional orders and 
obscuring their underlying consolidation of power, but if populists are able to main-
tain power for long periods of time, they will likely become overtly illiberal, arguing 
that their substantive goals cannot be met within the confines of liberal democracy. 
This suggests at least two separate agendas: one that prevents the forms of constitu-
tional change that allow populists to mold the constitutional order so that they be-
come difficult to dislodge and a second that makes a stronger affirmative case for 
the virtues of liberal democracy. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the rise of populist political leaders in the West, such 
as President Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen, the study of 
populism has become a central concern. The rising importance 
of populism in the West follows a period in which it has seen a re-
surgence in other regions, particularly Latin America—former 
Presidents Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador are leading examples—and Eastern Europe, where po-
litical parties in Hungary and Poland won power while wielding 
populist discourses. A large body of scholarship analyzes the def-
inition of populism, its complex causes, and its ambiguous impact 
on liberal democracy. Some emphasize a promise for rejuvena-
tion, others the threat of erosion.1 
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 1 See, for example, Paul Taggart, Populism 112–14 (Open University 2000) (noting 
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This Essay explores the ways in which populist leaders use 
the tools of constitutional change when they gain power. A num-
ber of recent populist leaders and parties have either replaced 
their existing constitutions entirely or adopted sweeping pack-
ages of amendments. President Alberto Fujimori in Peru 
(1995),2 Chávez in Venezuela (1999),3 Correa in Ecuador 
(2008),4 President Evo Morales in Bolivia (2009),5 and the Fidesz 
Party in Hungary (2011)6 all replaced their existing constitu-
tions once they came to power. Many of these leaders, as well 
as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey (2017),7 pursued 
major packages of amendments to the constitution that made 
deep structural changes to the constitutional texts. If populism is 
defined as an ideology that divides the world into two antagonistic 
groups, a “pure people” represented by the populist leaders and a 
“corrupt elite” against whom they struggle,8 then there is a rela-
tionship between populist ideology and large-scale constitutional 
change that will refound the political and social order. 
I argue that constitutional change under populism carries out 
three core functions: deconstructing the existing political regime, 
serving as an ideological critique that promises to overcome flaws 
in the prior constitutional order, and consolidating power in the 
hands of the populist leadership. These tendencies appear inher-
ent in nearly all populist projects, and thus studying populist 
constitutional change is helpful in understanding populism in 
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(Pennsylvania 2016) (describing the dangerous tendencies of populist parties once they take 
power); Frank M. Walsh, The Legal Death of the Latin American Democracy: Bolivarian 
Populism’s Model for Centralizing Power, Eliminating Political Opposition, and Under-
mining the Rule of Law, 16 L & Bus Rev Americas 241, 242 (2010) (detailing how Chávez 
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 2 Philip Mauceri, Return of the Caudillo: Autocratic Democracy in Peru, 18 Third 
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 8 Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 Govt & Opposition 541, 543 (2004). 
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general. Access to tools of large-scale constitutional change accen-
tuates both the threat of populism to liberal democracy and its 
promise as a corrective. Large-scale constitutional change allows 
populist leaders to wipe away the existing institutional order and 
consolidate power in a particularly rapid and durable way while 
also permitting experimentation with constitutional forms that 
might rejuvenate ossified or failing constitutional orders. But I 
also argue that there is a likely trajectory to populist constitu-
tional projects: if populists are successfully able to centralize 
power and retain it for long periods of time, the regime will be-
come increasingly and overtly opposed to liberal democracy. 
The rest of this Essay is organized as follows. Part I briefly 
defines populism and describes the broader debate about its im-
pact on liberal democracy. Parts II, III, and IV outline the three 
major functions of populist constitutions: undermining the exist-
ing institutional order, constructing a new order built on a critical 
vision of the old one, and consolidating power in the hands of pop-
ulist leaders, respectively. Part V asks whether there is a trajec-
tory to populist regimes, tentatively finding that if populists are 
able to remain in office, the consolidation of power becomes an 
increasingly overt part of the regime’s ideology over time, effec-
tively merging with the critical function. This Essay concludes by 
suggesting two possible responses to the challenge of populism for 
liberal-democratic constitutionalism. The first seeks to block 
forms of constitutional change that allow populists to remain in 
power for long periods of time and thus have a particularly corro-
sive effect. The second response is deeper—it suggests that popu-
lism spurs us to confront and respond to the weaknesses in liberal 
democracy that give legitimacy to populist constitutional projects. 
I.  DEFINING POPULISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 
Populism is a fiercely contested concept. Nonetheless, recent 
work has suggested relative consensus about some core elements 
of its definition. This work has tended to reject definitions that 
are based on a particular set of economic policies9 or that identify 
populism with a particular configuration of socioeconomic class 
 
 9 See, for example, Kurt Weyland, Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the 
Study of Latin American Politics, 34 Comp Polit 1, 9–11 (2001) (showing that populism in 
Latin American is compatible with both neoliberal and statist economic policies). 
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support,10 because these definitions identify only given instances 
of populism rather than the broader phenomenon. Instead, popu-
lism is seen as an ideology, strategy, discourse, style of political 
mobilization, or political practice based primarily on antagonism 
between “the people,” represented by the populist leader, and a 
“corrupt elite.”11 Professor Cas Mudde, for example, influentially 
defines populism as a “thin-centred ideology” that “considers so-
ciety to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antag-
onistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people.”12 Because the ideology is 
“thin,” it can accommodate a number of different substantive po-
litical projects.13 
The nature of the “pure people” and “corrupt elite” differ 
widely across these different variants of populism. Scholars of 
Latin America, for example, have noted a number of different 
waves or varieties of populism: traditional populist projects fo-
cused on political incorporation and economic equality against an 
oligarchical elite, neoliberal populists who passed privatizations 
and structural economic reforms by arguing against corrupt state 
elites, and radical populists who have emphasized political par-
ticipation, socioeconomic justice, and inclusion of traditionally ex-
cluded political groups against an elite of privileged insiders who 
have controlled economic and political power.14 Historians of the 
United States have likewise identified both right-wing and left-
wing variants of populism over time, with a very different set of 
 
 10 See, for example, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism and 
(Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis, in Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser, eds, Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democ-
racy? 1, 5 (Cambridge 2012). 
 11 See Mudde, 39 Govt & Opposition at 543 (cited in note 8) (ideology); Weyland, 34 
Comp Polit at 14 (cited in note 9) (strategy); Kirk A. Hawkins, Is Chávez Populist? Meas-
uring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective, 42 Comp Polit Stud 1040, 1043–45 
(2009) (discourse); Carlos de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America 4 (Ohio 2d ed 
2010) (“style of political mobilization”); Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: 
Performance, Political Style, and Representation 28 (Stanford 2016) (“political style”). 
 12 Mudde, 39 Govt & Opposition at 543–44 (cited in note 8). 
 13 See, for example, Taggart, Populism at 2 (cited in note 1) (referring to populism as 
a “chameleon”); Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at 9 (cited in 
note 10) (noting that populism can be “attached to other ideologies, be they thick (e.g. 
liberalism, socialism) or thin (e.g. ecologism, nationalism)”). 
 14 See de la Torre, Populist Seduction at xiii–xiv (cited in note 11). 
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“elite” opponents.15 Some variants of populism are defined in op-
position to racial or ethnic outsiders and their supposed enablers 
within domestic elite groups. But other variants lack this ethnic 
dimension and instead define outsiders along socioeconomic class 
lines or with dichotomies between privileged governmental elites 
and the ordinary people.16 Populism can also spring up in more or 
less consolidated democracies in both developed and developing 
contexts.17 Take, for example, Presidents Trump and Chávez, 
who, for all of their ideological differences, have both been widely 
identified as populists. 
Most work sees an “uneasy” relationship between populist po-
litical movements and liberal-democratic constitutionalism.18 
Some academics argue that populist leadership can highlight de-
ficiencies in existing liberal democracies or help to bring in new 
political forces that were previously marginalized.19 In this sense, 
populism can help to transition an authoritarian regime into a 
more democratic one or might help to rejuvenate a stagnating lib-
eral democracy by raising pressure to ameliorate its defects or to 
increase inclusion or legitimacy. 
But in many contexts, populism poses a threat to liberal 
democracy. This threat was captured succinctly by Professor 
Jan-Werner Müller: the ideology defined by Mudde tends to sim-
plify the world into Manichean terms. Thus, this leads populists 
to argue not only that they represent the popular will but that 
they are the only legitimate carriers of this will.20 Those against 
whom populists define their projects—the corrupt elite and their 
allies—have no legitimate standing to act as full citizens of the 
state or to compete in the electoral sphere. Under this conception, 
the threat is that populists will seek to make themselves harder 
to dislodge, weaken checks on their own power, and undermine 
 
 15 See Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History 3–4 (Basic 
Books 1995) (comparing the populism of reformers on the left in the late nineteenth cen-
tury to the populism employed by the Cold War right in the mid-twentieth century). 
 16 See Cas Mudde, Conclusion: Some Further Thoughts on Populism, in Carlos de la 
Torre, ed, The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives 431, 442 (Kentucky 2015). 
 17 See Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson, Introduction: The Evolution of 
Latin American Populism and the Debates over Its Meaning, in Carlos de la Torre and 
Cynthia J. Arnson, eds, Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century 1, 8 
(Johns Hopkins 2013). 
 18 See de la Torre, Populist Seduction at 201 (cited in note 11). 
 19 See Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at 20–21 (cited in 
note 10). 
 20 See Müller, What Is Populism? at 3 (cited in note 1) (“Populists claim that they, 
and they alone, represent the people.”). 
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protections for minority groups who are left outside of their defi-
nition of the “people.”21 They will not abolish courts and constitu-
tions, but they will bend those institutions in ways that make the 
regime both less liberal and less democratic. Populist constitu-
tional projects can be read as supporting both sides of this dichot-
omy. As the following parts show, they are multifaceted: they of-
ten act both as critiques of preexisting constitutional orders and 
as instruments used by populist leaders to consolidate power and 
undermine checks on their authority. 
II.  DECONSTRUCTING THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Populists are often harshly critical of core aspects of the ex-
isting institutional order and rely on tools of constitutional and 
legal change to undermine it. This follows from identification of 
the existing institutional order with the corrupt elite who popu-
lists define as the enemy. Of course, the range of tools for taking 
aim at these institutions is very wide. Discourse, for example, can 
be effective at undermining existing institutions, as can legisla-
tive or administrative measures. The case of President Trump in 
the United States is an example. He has launched a series of rhe-
torical attacks on the judiciary and the media while also using 
appointments and administrative measures to place leaders in 
charge of agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Department of State, who would partially or wholly under-
mine the mission of those agencies.22 The goal of the “[d]econstruc-
tion of the [a]dministrative [s]tate” is highly likely to be at-
tempted in the United States without recourse to formal 
constitutional change.23 Symbolism may also be a powerful tool.  
 
 21 See Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at 21–22 (cited in 
note 10). 
 22 See Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges—and Why 
His Tirades Are ‘Worse Than Wrong’ (Wash Post, Apr 26, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V9HU-QCH5; Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Head Stacks Agency with Climate 
Change Skeptics (NY Times, Mar 7, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/03/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protection-agency.html?_r=0 (vis-
ited Dec 24, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Eliana Johnson and Michael Crowley, The 
Bottleneck in Rex Tillerson’s State Department (Politico, June 4, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SLH2-MR9M. This discourse is typical of populists. See, for example, Allan 
R. Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chávez Authoritarian Ex-
periment 177–81 (Cambridge 2010). 
 23 Jeremy W. Peters, Bannon’s Worldview: Dissecting the Message of “The Fourth 
Turning” (NY Times, Apr 8, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/us/ 
politics/bannon-fourth-turning.html (visited Dec 24, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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That said, replacement of the existing constitution is a para-
digmatic way to deconstruct the existing institutional order. A 
sense of deep crisis due to the actions of corrupt elites is both a 
triggering condition for populist leaders to gain support and a 
construct they use to advance their projects.24 Events like the de-
institutionalization of the party system, a perception of pervasive 
state corruption, and deep economic downturn feed populist 
movements and put them in positions in which they can win 
power.25 The constitution-making moment allows populist leaders 
to give a dramatic response to this environment of crisis. At the 
same time, it also helps them to deepen and shape the meaning 
of crisis by creating a context in which the foundational institu-
tions of state are up for grabs and the old order can be swept 
away. Related to this is a preference for sweeping or far-reaching 
change. As Professor Ernesto Laclau has argued, populists oper-
ate off of a political logic that seeks to aggregate a large number 
of social and political demands and resolve them through the 
popular–elite dichotomy.26 The aggregation of many demands 
from different social sectors points toward a more systemic re-
sponse, such as constitution-making rather than the mechanisms 
of ordinary politics. 
When major constitutional changes have been carried out by 
populists, they often monopolize control if the political context al-
lows them to do so rather than adopt a consensual process that 
compromises with elements of the existing political regime. In 
Venezuela and Ecuador, for example, the forces of Presidents 
Chávez and Correa rewrote their respective constitutions unilat-
erally. They took steps, such as the design of electoral laws, the 
removal of potentially hostile justices, and the closing of legisla-
tures, to ensure that Constituent Assemblies were controlled by 
their allies and could not be constrained by other institutions con-
trolled by different political forces.27 In Hungary, likewise, the 
Fidesz Party used its two-thirds supermajority of parliamentary 
seats to adopt a new constitution quickly and without opposition 
 
 24 See Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism at 118 (cited in note 11) (arguing that 
crisis is both an external trigger for populism and constructed by populists to further their 
agendas). 
 25 See id at 113–16. 
 26 See Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason 77–78 (Verso 2005). 
 27 See de la Torre, Populist Seduction at 187–88 (cited in note 11); Kenneth M. 
Roberts, Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, in Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, eds, Populism in Europe and the Americas 136, 148–49 (cited in note 10). 
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input.28 In Turkey, President Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and 
Development Party initially tried to negotiate constitutional 
change in a pluralistic way. When that process broke down, he 
bided his time and imposed reforms that switched the governing 
structure to a strong presidential system (almost) unilaterally 
when he gained sufficient seats to do so.29 Unilateral, rather than 
negotiated, constitution-making or constitutional change fits pop-
ulist ideology because it avoids negotiation with members of a cor-
rupted elite. Furthermore, majoritarian demonstrations of popu-
lar will—such as referenda—may serve in the populist worldview 
as a superior alternative to engagement with opposition political 
groups.30 
The replacement of Venezuela’s constitution in 1999 offers a 
good example of this logic. Chávez ran for office in a context of a 
deep political crisis: the two-party pact that had governed the coun-
try had lost much of its legitimacy by the late 1990s, and the polit-
ical system was widely viewed as corrupt and elitist.31 Chávez was 
in a prime position to exploit this crisis: he was not only an out-
sider to the traditional system, but as a colonel in the army, he 
had actually led a failed coup against it. Ironically, that event 
launched his political career when he appeared on television in 
its aftermath.32 Chávez explicitly ran against the existing institu-
tional order and promised to deliver a new constitution to wipe it 
away.33 Once elected, he delivered on this promise by calling a 
Constituent Assembly dominated by his supporters that was con-
stituted outside of the existing institutional framework.34 This as-
sembly rewrote the constitution in a span of several months.35 The 
Constituent Assembly, dominated by Chávez’s supporters, used 
 
 28 See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Disabling the 
Constitution, 23 J Democracy 138, 141–42 (July 2012). 
 29 The ruling Justice and Development Party did need to negotiate in order to gain 
the support of the minor Turkish Nationalist Party. See Ilayda Gunes, What’s at Stake in 
the Turkish Constitutional Amendment Proposal (ICONnect, Apr 14, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/35RZ-D7NG. 
 30 See William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 Brooklyn J 
Intl L 193, 234 (2012). 
 31 See Roberts, Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez at 138–
43 (cited in note 27). 
 32 See Kirk A. Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Per-
spective 17 (Cambridge 2010). 
 33 See Roberts, Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez at 148 
(cited in note 27). 
 34 Id at 148–49. 
 35 Id at 149. 
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its power to close down and replace existing state institutions.36 
It closed state assemblies and reduced the opposition-held con-
gress to a rump, stripping it of most of its members and powers.37 
It closed down the supreme court, which had alternated between 
empowering the process and trying to set limits on it.38 And it re-
placed key local leaders and labor union heads.39 As a result, the 
constitution-making process played a key role in sweeping away 
the remnants of the old order. 
Thus, populists are not only distinguished by a preference for 
widespread constitutional change, but change in an anti-Burkean 
sense. They seek to remake or refound the existing institutional 
order rather than building off it. The goal is to create a revolu-
tionary mindset of systemic change in which the basic rules of the 
game are themselves up for grabs.40 
III.  CRITIQUING THE OLD ORDER 
Populist projects of constitutional change are not just projects 
to deconstruct the old order. At least when populists are able to 
write their own constitutions, they also instantiate a substantive 
project. The exact nature of the political project implicit in popu-
list constitutions varies widely across countries and regions. But 
they tend to share a critical attitude toward the prior regime, 
which reflects as a harsh judgment on liberal democracy as prac-
ticed historically in that country. Thus, populist constitutions can 
be read as projects born out of a critique of past national experi-
ences with liberal democracy. 
In the Andes, populist constitutional discourse responded to 
historic patterns of socioeconomic inequality, elitism, and exclu-
sion. The Venezuelan constitution of 1999, for example, put a 
heavy emphasis on participation—it created new mechanisms, 
such as a recall that could be used even against the president and 
 
 36 See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 Ala L Rev 923, 945–
49 (2013). 
 37 Id at 947. 
 38 Id at 946–48. 
 39 Id at 948. 
 40 See Hawkins, Venezula’s Chavismo at 35–36 (cited in note 32) (describing how 
populism advocates for systemic change by painting the existing institutions as “[e]vil”); 
Oliver W. Lembcke and Christian Boulanger, Between Revolution and Constitution: The 
Roles of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in Gábor Attila Tóth, ed, Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law 269, 290–93 (CEU 2012) (noting 
the Fidesz Party’s references to the 2011 constitution as a “revolution”). 
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a civil-society commission for judicial appointments.41 Through 
the latter, individuals would be able to give input on political de-
cisions and hold political leaders to account.42 This responded to 
the widespread perception that the old regime, which was based 
on a two-party pact, was elitist, exclusionary, and corrupt. The 
Ecuadorian constitution written under the Correa regime is ex-
traordinarily rich in rights, containing, in particular, innova-
tive and generous environmental and socioeconomic rights.43 
The Bolivian constitution creates new forms of popular participa-
tion, defines the Bolivian state as “plurinational,” and grants an 
extensive set of rights and autonomy to indigenous groups, in con-
trast to their historic exclusion and repression.44 In all of these 
contexts, the constitution responded to the patterns of socioeco-
nomic inequality and exclusion that had historically marked the 
countries’ troubled constitutional histories. Neither participation, 
inclusion, nor thickened rights discourses, of course, are inher-
ently populist in nature. But, in these cases, they were wielded by 
leaders with populist discourses in order to critique existing prac-
tices of constitutionalism in their respective countries. 
In Hungary, a more nationalist strain of populism acted to 
fill a void arguably left in the prior constitutional order. Upon 
transitioning to democracy in 1989, Hungary did not adopt a new 
constitution but, instead, amended its Communist-era constitu-
tion of 1949, an arrangement that was meant to be temporary.45 
However, efforts to adopt a new permanent constitution in the 
1990s did not come to fruition, leaving the transition, in Professor 
Andrew Arato’s words, “incomplete.”46 The long preamble or “na-
tional avowal” to the 2011 constitution engages with this notion 
of an incomplete transition from Communist rule; it refers to a 
 
 41 See Landau, 64 Ala L Rev at 946–48 (cited in note 36). 
 42 See Roberts, Populism and Democracy in Venezuela at 149–50 (cited in note 27). 
The Chávez regime also experimented with a number of participation mechanisms at the 
subconstitutional level. For an overview, see Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo at 166–94 
(cited in note 32). 
 43 See Ximena Sosa, Populism in Ecuador: From José M. Velasco Ibarra to Rafael 
Correa, in Michael L. Conniff, ed, Populism in Latin America 159, 177 (Alabama 2d ed 2012). 
 44 See John Crabtree, From the MNR to the MAS: Populism, Parties, the State, and 
Social Movements in Bolivia since 1952, in de la Torre and Arnson, eds, Latin American 
Populism in the Twenty-First Century 269, 285, 288 (cited in note 17). 
 45 János Kis, Introduction: From the 1989 Constitution to the 2011 Fundamental 
Law, in Tóth, ed, Constitution for a Disunited Nation 1, 5–8 (cited in note 40). 
 46 Andrew Arato, Post-sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, 
Partial Failure, and Now What?, 26 S Afr J Hum Rts 19, 19 (2010). 
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“historical constitution” that was broken by the “foreign occupa-
tions” of both the Nazi and communist dictatorships and states 
explicitly that the 1949 constitution was the “basis for tyrannical 
rule” and thus “invalid.”47 The new constitution also adopts a 
more historical and nationalist basis for the state, in contrast to 
the thinner and more universalist valence of the postcommunist 
legal order. For example, the new constitution, working alongside 
legal changes at around the same time, moves the state toward a 
more ethnically based conception of citizenship,48 and it empha-
sizes the role of Christianity in building the Hungarian state and 
nation.49 Because the old Hungarian constitution was fairly thin, 
much of its meaning had been constructed in a universalist mode 
by the Constitutional Court.50 An amendment to the new consti-
tution explicitly rejects this legacy by providing that court deci-
sions under the old constitution were all “repealed.”51 
In all of these cases, then, the new constitutions allowed pop-
ulist leaders to signal ways in which the state would now follow 
new directions and break from perceived failures or weaknesses 
of past regimes. A key notion that seems to unite many of these 
contexts is the populist claim to have recovered the authentic con-
stitutional tradition of a country. In Venezuela, Chávez used the 
symbolism of the national independence hero, Simón Bolívar, to 
suggest ways in which his project would rejuvenate Venezuelan 
constitutionalism.52 In Hungary, as noted above, the constitu-
tional drafters used a selective reading of history to suggest that 
a historical, authentic Hungarian constitutional heritage was 
 
 47 See Hungary Const Preamble. The Polish regime has also justified many of its ac-
tions, such as its purges of the judiciary, with an idea that Communists were never properly 
removed from these institutions. Michał Broniatowski, Polish Government Moves to Take 
Control of Top Court (Politico, July 14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/D5CH-4ANJ. 
 48 See Zsolt Körtvélyesi, From “We the People” to “We the Nation,” in Toth, ed, 
Constitution for a Disunited Nation 111, 113–17 (cited in note 40) (analyzing how the lan-
guage of the Hungarian constitution subtly defines the people of Hungary by ethnicity, 
not political affiliation). 
 49 See Renáta Uitz, Freedom of Religion and Churches: Archaeology in a Constitution-
Making Assembly, in Toth, ed, Constitution for a Disunited Nation 197, 199–202 (cited in 
note 40) (discussing how the Hungarian constitution makes churches autonomous from 
the state and allows the government to privilege certain churches). 
 50 See Arato, 26 S Afr J Hum Rts at 31 (cited in note 46) (describing how the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court enforced Hungary’s “patch-work” constitution). 
 51 See Hungary Const Amend IV, Art XIX. 
 52 The Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 in fact names the state the “Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela,” and the first sentence of the preamble refers to the “historic 
example of our liberator Simón Bolívar” as a basis to “refound the state.” Venezuela 
Const Preamble. 
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broken by communism and a tainted transition away from it.53 
The point, of course, is not to defend the normative desirability of 
any of these particular projects. It is rather to highlight the ex-
perimental space that populist constitutional change can poten-
tially inhabit. 
IV.  CONSOLIDATING POWER 
Populist projects of constitutional change tend to consolidate 
the power of incumbents, erode the separation of powers, and 
weaken protections for minority or opposition groups. New con-
stitutions written by populist leaders (or packages of constitu-
tional amendments) have often centralized power in the executive 
branch and lengthened the amount of time that incumbents could 
serve in power. They have also tended to rework the rules for ap-
pointment and jurisdiction of bodies like constitutional courts 
(thus making these institutions easier to control) and to 
strengthen the control of the state over the media and other key 
aspects of civil society, such as unions and religious organiza-
tions. In a sense, the project is to replace the existing institu-
tional order with a new one in which populists control their own 
institutions.54 
For example, the new constitutions of Venezuela and Ecuador 
both greatly increased presidential power and the length of time 
for which incumbents could serve; they also replaced opposition-
held institutions, such as courts, with redesigned institutions 
that were more easily controlled by Presidents Chávez and 
Correa.55 The Hungarian constitution similarly made it harder to 
dislodge the populist Fidesz Party from power and greatly re-
duced the power and autonomy of institutions designed to check 
its power.56 In Turkey, constitutional amendments weakened the 
 
 53 See Catherine Dupré, Human Dignity: Rhetoric, Protection, and Instrumentalisa-
tion, in Toth, ed, Constitution for a Disunited Nation 143, 166 (cited in note 40) (noting 
how the new Hungary Constitution rejects the communist constitution on “the basis of a 
tyrannical rule”), citing Hungary Const Preamble. 
 54 See Müller, What Is Populism? at 62 (cited in note 1) (“Populists in power are fine 
with institutions—which is to say, their institutions.”). 
 55 See César Montúfar, Rafael Correa and His Plebiscitary Citizens’ Revolution, in de 
la Torre and Arnson, eds, Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century 295, 313–
14 (cited in note 17); Landau, 64 Ala L Rev at 948–49 (cited in note 36) (describing how 
Venezuelan governing bodies across various levels of government, including the Venezuelan 
supreme court, were replaced with new institutions that were loyal to Chávez). 
 56 See Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, 23 J Democracy at 143 (cited in note 28) 
(“The old constitution had many checks. The new constitution has substantially weakened 
all of them.”). 
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independence of the constitutional court and shifted the parlia-
mentary system to a presidential system with a very strong pres-
ident, thus centralizing power in the person of President 
Erdoğan.57 
To some degree, populist projects emphasize the majoritarian 
aspects of democracy while showing hostility toward liberal 
checks on majority power.58 But populist constitutional projects 
cannot simply be read as pitting “democracy” against “liberalism.” 
They also often target the electoral machinery, using institutions 
like electoral commissions, courts, and the media to tilt the play-
ing field, making it more difficult for the opposition to win 
power.59 As Professor Müller notes, populist movements not only 
seek to win majorities and unfetter them but also tend to believe 
that their political opponents are illegitimate and do not deserve 
to hold power.60 In this sense, liberalism and democracy tend to 
erode together.61 
Once again, formal constitutional change is not the only level 
at which these projects operate, and some have operated without 
replacing or amending the constitution at all. A very important 
tool is packing institutions that are designed to check majority 
power, such as constitutional courts, ombudspersons, human-
rights commissions, and regulatory commissions overseeing the 
media with pro-government people. Courts and other actors con-
trolled by incumbents are useful for harassing and undermining 
the opposition through what Professor Ozan Varol has called 
“stealth authoritarianism”: the selective use of existing legal 
tools, such as defamation and electoral registration, to undermine 
 
 57 See Ozan O. Varol, Lucia Della Pellegrina, and Nuno Garoupa, An Empirical 
Analysis of Judicial Transformation in Turkey, 65 Am J Comp L 187, 197–99 (2017) (de-
scribing the process through which the ruling party gained control over the constitutional 
court); Gunes, What’s at Stake in the Turkish Constitutional Amendment Proposal (cited in 
note 29). 
 58 See Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at 21 (cited in note 
10) (“Populism can use the notion and praxis of popular sovereignty to contravene the 
‘checks and balances’ and separation of powers of liberal democracy.”). 
 59 See Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes after the Cold War 6 (Cambridge 2010) (describing how parties can maintain con-
trol by skewing the electoral playing field in their favor without resorting to “overt fraud 
or civil-liberties violations”). 
 60 See Müller, What Is Populism? at 56–57 (cited in note 1). 
 61 See id (calling on scholars to stop the “thoughtless invocation of ‘illiberal democ-
racy’”); Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism at 9 (cited in note 59) (noting 
how the selective use of “legal” repression against political opponents can stymie a truly 
competitive democracy). 
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the opposition.62 They can also adopt informal forms of constitu-
tional change by adopting incumbent-friendly interpretations of 
the constitution that entrench the power of incumbents and 
weaken the opposition.63 In Poland, while the ruling Law and 
Justice Party, to date, has lacked the votes to engage in formal 
constitutional amendment or replacement, it has nonetheless car-
ried out substantial change by packing the constitutional court 
through dubious legal means before passing statutes of question-
able constitutionality that the packed court has upheld.64 
Using constitutional change to tilt the electoral playing field 
is not the exclusive province of populists. Many would-be author-
itarian actors now rely on tools of legal change to undermine con-
stitutional orders that superficially look like liberal democracies. 
Not all of these actors adopt populist discourse or political prac-
tices.65 Likewise, the reshaping or use of law for partisan ad-
vantage seems to be a fairly common tool by actors that are 
viewed as “normal” or “pluralist” within more or less consolidated 
liberal democracies. Two arguable recent examples are the use of 
impeachment and anticorruption law as an instrument by elites 
to weaken the Labor Party in Brazil, and the use of gerrymander-
ing and other tools, such as voter identification laws, to gain a 
durable advantage in elections in the United States.66 
What may be characteristic of populism, then, is not merely the 
aim of tilting the playing field, but that aim in combination with the 
preference for the destabilizing and widespread constitutional 
change noted above. Populists target the existing institutional or-
der, not just a set of political opponents. Because of that charac-
teristic, populist changes may produce greater and more lasting 
 
 62 Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 Iowa L Rev 1673, 1678–79 (2015). 
 63 See Rosalind Dixon, David Landau, and Yaniv Roznai, Doctrinal Capture and the 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine *19–22 (unpublished manuscript, 
2016) (on file with author). 
 64 See Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Farewell to the Separation of Powers—on the Ju-
dicial Purge and the Capture in the Heart of Europe (VerfassungsBlog, July 19, 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LU7V-Q6UW (noting that the constitutional court was tar-
geted first by the regime so that other measures could be upheld without a need for con-
stitutional amendment). 
 65 See Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo at 42 (cited in note 32) (giving examples of au-
thoritarian actors, such as President Vladimir Putin, who do not adopt populist discourse). 
 66 I am grateful to Professor Mark Tushnet for noting these examples while serving 
as a commentator for the Panel on Constitution-Making as Transnational Legal Order II 
at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in Mexico City, Mexico, June 22, 2017. See also 
Arthur Schott Lopes, The Hermeneutics of Brazil’s Impeachment, 37 Harv Intl Rev 11, 11 
(2016) (discussing corruption and the impeachment in Brazil); Varol, 100 Iowa L Rev at 
1702–03 (cited in note 62) (discussing voter identification laws and gerrymandering). 
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effects, and those effects may reach beyond the political sphere to 
also change the relationship between the government and civil 
society or the media. In this sense, formal constitutional change—
especially constitution-making—is a particularly efficient way to 
entrench incumbent control and undermine the separation of pow-
ers. As compared to other mechanisms, it may allow populists to 
destabilize the existing constitutional order more rapidly and thor-
oughly and to impose a new political order in a more durable way.67 
Consider, for example, how processes of constitutional 
change or replacement interact with the technique of packing an 
institution. Populist leaders have often ascended to power while 
facing institutions, such as courts, that were still controlled by 
independent or opposition actors. Constitutional amendment or 
replacement allowed them to speed up the clock dramatically in 
order to quickly take control of these institutions. In Turkey, for 
example, the ruling party used a set of constitutional amend-
ments in 2010 to expand the size of the Supreme Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors as well as its constitutional court, allow-
ing the government to rapidly pack both institutions.68 A similar 
dynamic occurred with the Fidesz regime in Hungary, where a 
constitutional amendment and a new constitution expanded the 
size of the court.69 And in Venezuela, as already noted, Chávez’s 
constitution-making process in 1999 allowed him to purge and re-
place members of opposition-held institutions very quickly.70 
Furthermore, formal constitutional change may prove more 
durable than other forms of change, making populist incumbents 
more difficult to dislodge from power and increasing the long-
term harm done to the liberal-democratic order. An example is 
 
 67 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 212–14 
(2013) (highlighting how constitutional reforms supported the rise and entrenchment of 
powerful executives in Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Hungary). 
 68 See Varol, Pellegrina, and Garoupa, 65 Am J Comp L at 197–99 (cited in note 57) 
(discussing how amending the constitution allowed the ruling party to formally subject 
the judiciary “to the elected branches,” which would curb its ability to check the party’s 
subsequent actions). 
 69 See Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, 23 J Democracy at 139–40 (cited in note 28). 
 70 See text accompanying notes 36–39. Formal constitutional change, and especially 
constitution-making, may also allow for a particularly destabilizing scope of change. A 
replacement or major constitutional reform allows incumbents to alter the composition or 
functioning of many institutions at the same time. As Professor Kim Lane Scheppele has 
argued with respect to Hungary, the various changes can interact to produce a particularly 
strong effect. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Gov-
ernance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 Governance 559, 561 (2013) (describing Hungary as 
an example of a government taking actions that were technically constitutional or had 
European constitutional analogues but in combination created an authoritarian state). 
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the recent proposed constitutional reforms in Turkey, which aim 
to replace the country’s current political system with a pure pres-
idential one that has a very strong president. The ruling AKP and 
Erdoğan have had considerable success in changing the Turkish 
constitutional system without relying heavily on the tools of for-
mal constitutional change.71 Nonetheless, the formal amend-
ments may make these changes more resistant to shifts in politi-
cal context. The amendments strongly tie the electoral fortunes of 
the parliament to the president by holding both sets of elections 
at the same time, which should make it harder for the opposition 
to gain a political foothold.72 The amendments also sharply in-
crease presidential power during both emergencies and ordinary 
periods, eliminate the office of the prime minister, and reduce the 
ability of the parliament to investigate or control the president.73 
These changes mean that even if opposition parties managed to 
gain a parliamentary majority, they would have more difficulty 
undoing the shift in balance of power. In Hungary, similarly, the 
new constitution instantiated key institutional changes that 
would allow Fidesz to exert a strong influence over—and even 
destabilize—the country’s democratic order even if they lose a 
parliamentary election. For example, the constitution created a 
budgetary commission, and the government stacked it with 
Fidesz supporters serving long terms.74 This commission has the 
ability to prevent enactment of the budget under certain condi-
tions, which may set in motion a process leading to dissolution of 
parliament and the calling of new elections.75 
Populists do not always engage in constitution-making or 
large-scale formal constitutional change when they take power. 
In both Poland and the United States, governing populists have 
not yet carried out changes at this level, either because of insuffi-
cient representation in the legislature or other bodies charged 
with carrying out constitutional change (both countries) or be-
cause of cultural constraints (the United States). But populists 
 
 71 See Ozan Varol, Presidentialism in Turkey: Is It Already Here? (ConstitutionNet, 
Nov 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3UMK-VXVL. 
 72 See Gunes, What’s at Stake in the Turkish Constitutional Amendment Proposal 
(cited in note 29). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (or 
How to Build a Constitutional “Democratorship” in Plain Sight) *37–38, archived at 
http://perma.cc/52HG-PPYE. 
 75 Id at *38. 
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tend to have a preference for large-scale constitutional change,76 
and this mode of change may be an especially effective way to de-
stabilize the old regime and to consolidate power. Access to the 
tools of formal constitutional change may thus heighten the 
threat posed by populism to liberal democracy. At the same time, 
the previous Part showed that populist constitution-making could 
conceivably enhance the critical function played by populists, per-
haps allowing them to develop richer alternatives to the existing 
political order. 
V.  THE TRAJECTORY OF POPULIST CONSTITUTIONS 
One way to make sense of these competing effects is to consider 
how the two major functions of populist constitution-making—the 
critical function and the consolidation of power—interact over 
time. Initially, populist constitutions present themselves as “im-
proved” versions of the prior liberal-democratic constitutional or-
der while disguising the undermining of checks on the power of 
populist leaders. 
Populist constitutions do not abandon the trappings of key 
liberal institutions, such as constitutional courts, and go to great 
lengths to justify their choices as acceptable within liberal democ-
racies—or even as improved versions of constitutional design. 
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele notes the “frankenstate” approach 
that was important in Hungary, where constitution-makers care-
fully selected a configuration of institutional designs likely to 
maximize Fidesz’s power, but also were able to justify individual 
design choices to the Council of Europe and European Union as 
being present in some other “mature” liberal democracy.77 Draft-
ers can have a dramatic effect on institutions like courts simply by 
changing the calendar or rules for their members’ appointment. 
Conflicting pressures toward critique and consolidation can 
also be accommodated through different levels of change. A com-
mon pattern is for the text of the new constitutions to proclaim a 
shift or advance in liberal-democratic constitutionalism while 
more covert formal and informal tools are used to make the re-
gime less liberal and less democratic. Such tools work by packing 
courts and other institutions and by allowing the incumbents to 
exercise more power over the media and other aspects of civil so-
ciety. In Hungary, for example, the governing party passed a set 
 
 76 See text accompanying notes 2–8. 
 77 See Scheppele, 26 Governance at 561 (cited in note 70). 
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of temporary constitutional provisions78 and the constitution also 
delegated a very substantial amount of the work in constructing 
a legal framework on sensitive issues to “cardinal laws.”79 To-
gether these two aspects of design did much of the work in 
strengthening the power of the governing majority over other as-
pects of the state and civil society. In Venezuela, likewise, the 
1999 constitution included an innovative method for selecting the 
supreme court by giving a significant role to a commission staffed 
largely by representatives of civil society, a change that Chávez 
could present as part of a new participatory mode of government 
that would be superior to the closed and elitist nature of the old 
constitutional regime.80 Yet Venezuela’s National Assembly 
avoided setting up this commission, opting instead to rely on a 
temporary constitutional amendment (and later other devices) to 
centralize appointment power in the executive branch.81 
In this phase, as Scheppele notes, populist constitutional pro-
jects could be read as posing more of a detection-and-enforcement 
challenge for liberal-democratic constitutionalism rather than an 
ideological challenge.82 That is, populist constitutionalism tends 
to masquerade as liberal democracy even when it is not, and the 
problem is figuring out how to use tools of domestic or interna-
tional law to combat the covert moves that entrench the power of 
populist leaders and undermine checks on their authority. But in 
the long run, populism may pose a more ideological and thus fun-
damental challenge: a search for an alternative form of govern-
ment that is clearly illiberal and increasingly undemocratic. 
This is shown most clearly through a trajectory that I would 
identify as empirically likely—if not certain—with populist con-
stitutions: when leaders are able to remain in power for long pe-
riods of time, the consolidation of power and undermining of 
 
 78 These included provisions allowing entities close to the government to transfer 
judicial cases, early retirement of judges and prosecutors, limitations on judicial power, 
more state power over recognition of churches, and special procedures allowing the gov-
ernment to control appointments to constitutionally independent institutions. See, for ex-
ample, Tamas Boros, Constitutional Amendments in Hungary: The Government’s Struggle 
against the Constitutional Court *2–3 (Friedrich Ebert Foundation Working Paper, Feb 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/HC84-GZPA. 
 79 As an example, the Cardinal Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Status of 
Churches gave the parliament power to approve the registration of churches by a two-
thirds majority and threatened those not approved with loss of their status. See Uitz, Free-
dom of Religion and Churches at 208–12 (cited in note 49). 
 80 See Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela at 227 (cited in note 22). 
 81 See id at 226–30. 
 82 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U Chi L Rev 545, 582–83 (2018). 
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checks will tend to become an increasingly overt part of their ide-
ology, merging with the critique of past liberal-democratic re-
gimes. Over time, the argument will no longer be about a deepen-
ing or shift in liberal-democratic practices, but rather the 
constraints of liberal constitutionalism may come to be viewed as 
dangerous hindrances to the projects that populist leaders pur-
sue. Leaders will become increasingly willing to define their pro-
jects in other terms, as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán did recently when he referred to his aim as the construc-
tion of an “illiberal” regime and pointed to Turkey and Russia, 
rather than the West, as models for that regime.83 
In the Andes, the new constitutions written in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia initially maintained presidential term lim-
its, although they tended to lengthen them.84 But after a while, 
Presidents Chávez, Correa, and Morales all sought changes to 
their own constitutions in order to remain in power indefinitely, 
and in each case, courts allowed these maneuvers to proceed de-
spite constitutional texts that seemingly protected against sensi-
tive constitutional changes of this kind.85 The logic in each case 
was that the leaders were indispensable to the fulfillment of the 
political and economic projects being pursued: the goals of greater 
participation, inclusion, and socioeconomic equality could not be 
carried out without the leaders themselves staying in power.86 
This reflects, of course, a personalization of power that is often 
characteristic of populist regimes.87 But beyond that, it shows a 
heightened tension between the imperative of liberal governance 
to limit power and the constitutional projects being carried 
out—liberalism in the framing of the regime becomes an obsta-
cle to achievement of greater socioeconomic justice and inclu-
sion. Venezuela is perhaps the most interesting case of such a 
framing. A major package of amendments proposed in 2007 by 
 
 83 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free Univer-
sity and Student Camp (Hungarian Government, July 26, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/T574-WE9Z. 
 84 David Landau, Presidential Term Limits in Latin America and the Limits of 
Transnational Constitutional Dialogue, 12 L & Ethics Hum Rts *2 (forthcoming 2018), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8LEF-MYF8. 
 85 See id at *2; David Landau, Term Limits Manipulation across Latin America—
and What Constitutional Design Could Do about It (ConstitutionNet, July 21, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/ZLZ4-5SHS. 
 86 See Landau, 12 L & Ethics Hum Rts at *8 (cited in note 84). 
 87 See Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism at 52–55 (cited in note 11). 
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Chávez to his own 1999 constitution not only lengthened presi-
dential terms to seven years and abolished presidential term lim-
its; it also greatly increased emergency powers and weakened the 
remaining independence of the judiciary and other mechanisms 
of accountability, for example by making the recall procedures in 
the constitution harder to activate.88 At the same time, it proposed 
to create new social transfers and labor protections and new in-
stitutions for public participation in the state. The campaign for 
a “yes” vote argued that the referendum would deepen the tran-
sition to socialism and give more power to the people.89 
In Turkey, likewise, a set of constitutional reforms sponsored 
by the ruling party in 2010 combined a set of measures that in-
creased individual rights with other changes that expanded the 
size of the constitutional court and, in other relatively subtle 
ways, allowed the government to pack the judiciary.90 The debate 
occurred within the context of Turkey’s possible accession to the 
European Union, and a key argument of the “yes” vote was that 
the changes would facilitate this accession.91 The overall thrust of 
the changes thus appeared to be liberalizing while the illiberal 
efforts to establish control over the judiciary were more covert.92 
In 2017, the party sponsored another referendum to shift Turkey 
from a parliamentary to a presidential system with a very strong 
president who would hold the power to dissolve parliament and a 
high degree of control over judicial appointments.93 The referen-
dum occurred during a state of emergency following a 2016 at-
tempted coup, in the aftermath of which many dissidents were 
being jailed and removed from their positions for alleged collabo-
ration with coup plotters or terrorists.94 The arguments in favor 
 
 88 This referendum narrowly failed, but a reworked proposal that focused only on 
abolishing term limits passed in 2009. Many of the proposals defeated in the referendum 
were nonetheless later passed as statutes. Margarita López Maya and Alexandra 
Panzarelli, Populism, Rentierism, and Socialism in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of 
Venezuela, in de la Torre and Arnson, eds, Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First 
Century 239, 264 (cited in note 17). 
 89 See Chávez Urges Reform for Venezuela (BBC News Dec 1, 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/G8HK-2YYE (describing Chávez’s promise of power to the people); Allan 
R. Brewer-Carías, The Principle of Separation of Powers and Authoritarian Government 
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 90 Varol, Pellegrina, and Garoupa, 65 Am J Comp L at 197–98 (cited in note 57). 
 91 Id at 198. 
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 93 See Gunes, What’s at Stake in the Turkish Constitutional Amendment Proposal 
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of the referendum this time focused explicitly on the incumbent 
President Erdoğan and the need to preserve order against the 
threats posed both by Kurdish secessionists and by the forces be-
hind the coup.95 Again, liberal limitations on power were increas-
ingly viewed as an explicit hindrance to the constitutional project 
of the populist leader. 
Populists may begin as critics promising to deepen liberal de-
mocracy or reinforce an underemphasized aspect of it, but they 
end up viewing liberal democracy as an obstacle to attaining their 
goals. The nature of the project becomes increasingly clear: not 
an improved liberal democracy, but a different kind of constitu-
tional project altogether. Thus, populist constitutional regimes 
should be viewed as at least incipient challenges to liberal democ-
racy, not just as disguised attempts to undermine them. 
This trajectory is, again, a tendency, not an inevitability. Pop-
ulist leaders can lose or leave power, as Correa did in Ecuador.96 
And even for projects that continue to deepen, there is almost cer-
tainly a stopping point short of pure authoritarianism. Populists 
will likely continue to hold relatively clean elections, in part be-
cause a claim to represent popular will is at the core of their le-
gitimacy. This means that they can still lose referenda, as hap-
pened with term limit referenda in Venezuela (although a second 
attempt succeeded) and Bolivia.97 But, as recent events in Turkey 
and Venezuela remind us, countries can go quite far down the 
road to authoritarianism while avoiding massive electoral fraud 
on the day of the election. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has sought to clarify the functions that constitu-
tions play in populist regimes with an eye toward better under-
standing the challenge that populists pose to liberal-democratic 
constitutionalism. It has argued that constitutional change under 
populism plays three key functions: deconstructing the old re-
gime, consolidating power, and serving as an ideological critique 
 
 95 See Patrick Kingsley, Turkey’s Erdogan: Democracy’s Savior or Saboteur? (NY 
Times, Apr 14, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/world/europe/ 
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of existing experiences with liberal-democratic constitutionalism. 
The ambiguity inherent in populist constitutional projects is in-
escapable; they stand both as promises to improve liberal democ-
racy and as attempts to move away from it. Over time, however, 
the latter dimension may become increasingly overt, with popu-
lists casting liberal-democratic constitutionalism as an obstacle 
to their political projects. 
For those interested in responding to the challenge posed by 
populism, the analysis here suggests two avenues of inquiry. The 
first seeks to stop the most durable negative effects of populism 
on liberal democracy by putting boundaries on forms of change. 
In this sense, the goal is to prevent populists from using the tools 
of constitutional change to entrench themselves in power for long 
periods of time. Restraints on constitutional amendment (and 
even replacement), such as the unconstitutional-constitutional-
amendment doctrine, in some circumstances can act as a speed 
bump.98 Internationally, the cases of Hungary and Poland have 
created a wave of scholarship and policymaking on ways in which 
international and regional actors like the European Union and 
the Council of Europe could restrain domestic moves toward au-
thoritarianism.99 The difficulty, of course, is in identifying the 
forms of change that pose a particularly salient threat and in fig-
uring out how to make these interventions effective without 
 
 98 The unconstitutional-constitutional-amendment doctrine posits that proposed 
constitutional amendments may be “substantively unconstitutional because they under-
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(ideally) ossifying tools of change that might also be used to renew 
liberal-democratic orders. A disquieting possibility is that per-
forming both functions at once might be impossible; a successful 
project that limits problematic forms of constitutional change may 
inevitably limit experimentation that could rejuvenate liberal-
democratic constitutionalism. 
A second response runs deeper—rather than seeking to block 
populists from carrying out antidemocratic change, it seeks to re-
spond to the political forces that empower them. Within the do-
main of constitutionalism, one key goal would be to construct a 
stronger affirmative case for liberal-democratic constitutional-
ism. Populist constitutionalism is (or at least tends to become) a 
challenge to liberal democracy. It exploits the real or perceived 
weaknesses of liberal-democratic constitutionalism to make the 
case that illiberal forms of governance are better able to respond 
to popular needs. It is not enough to merely detect and stamp out 
illiberal practices; the best defense against the potentially corro-
sive effect of populism is likely to be a strong constitutional cul-
ture that protects against erosion of this type. And such a culture 
must be founded on a liberal-democratic constitutionalism that 
works—that delivers stability, socioeconomic equality, and inclu-
sion to its citizens. In this sense, at least, populism must be a 
mirror.100 It must spur us to confront and respond to the weak-
nesses of liberal democracy. 
 
 100 See Francisco Panizza, Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, in 
Francisco Panizza, ed, Populism and the Mirror of Democracy 1, 30 (Verso 2005): 
By raising awkward questions about modern forms of democracy, and often rep-
resenting the ugly face of the people, populism is neither the highest form of 
democracy nor its enemy, but a mirror in which democracy can contemplate it-
self, warts and all, and find out what it is about and what it is lacking. 
